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PARKLANE HOSIERY: OFFENSIVE USE OF
NONMUTUAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN FEDERAL COURTS
Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion),' like the related doctrine of res
judicata (claim preclusion),2 is a common law rule limiting the relitigation
of issues actually or necessarily determined by a judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction. Although distinct in operation, both doctrines
have the common purpose of judicial finality.3 From a policy standpoint,
the application of these doctrines protects individuals from vexatious liti-
gation and promotes the efficient use of judicial resources.'
At common law, courts developed the mutuality rule as a corollary to
these litigation preclusion doctrines.' The rule restricts the use of collat-
eral estoppel to cases in which the parties to the subsequent action were
parties or privies in the prior action.' Although due process forbids the use
of estoppel against one who was not a party to the first action,7 mutuality
1. For clarity, res judicata and collateral estoppel will be referred to as claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion respectively. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61-
68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). See also Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables. Parties, 50
IOWA L. REV. 27, 27-28 (1964). For a discussion of the distinction between litigation preclu-
sion by issue and by claim, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
Collateral estoppel forecloses relitigation even though the subsequent claim states a differ-
ent cause of action. See IB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 621-22 (2d ed. 1974).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
2. Res judicata refers to the effect given a prior judgment on the merits in a second
action between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action. Thus, a final
judgment on the merits is binding on parties or their privies to the extent that matters were,
or could have been, adjudicated in a prior lawsuit on the same cause of action. See lB
MOORE, supra note 1, 0.405[3], at 631-32. One who was "represented" in an action by a
prior party of record, if such representation amounts to an opportunity to "actually partici-
pate" in the action, is generally a privy of the prior party and bound by the prior judgment.
See IB MOORE, supra note I, 0.411[6], at 1553.
3. See Southern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
4. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971); Bernhard v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
See also Montana v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 970, 974 (1979) (preclusion doctrines favor
reliance on judicial determiniations by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent verdicts).
5. Although courts refer to the mutuality rule as a corollary to both issue and claim
preclusion, its application necessarily involves the effect of a prior judgment as collateral
estoppel rather than res judicata since the latter involves, by definition, the same parties or
their privies. See IB MOORE, supra note I, 0.412[l], at 1803.
6. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63
(1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
7. See also IB MOORE, supra note 1, 0.412[1], at 1808. The following illustration
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further restricts its use by one who was not a party in the prior action
against one who was a party.8 Thus, mutuality is based on the notion that
it is unfair to allow subsequent parties to use adverse judgments against a
prior party since the judgment could not be used against them. 9 As a re-
sult, mutuality allows a party who has litigated and lost in a prior action to
relitigate identical issues with new parties." Since the mutuality rule, un-
like due process, fails to distinguish between a party who has never liti-
gated and one who has fully litigated, it has provoked heavy criticism."
Accordingly, several courts have renounced the mutuality rule when a
defendant invokes collateral estoppel against a plaintiff who has previously
litigated and lost. 2 Courts have been reluctant, however, to abandon the
rule when a plaintiff invokes collateral estoppel to prevent a defendant
from relitigating issues decided against it in a prior action. 3 These respec-
tive uses of collateral estoppel by plaintiffs and defendants are commonly
referred to as offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. 4 Recently, how-
should clarify how due process considerations affect collateral estoppel: Able and Baker are
both injured in an accident allegedly caused by the negligence of Charles. Able sues
Charles, and a verdict favorable to Charles is reached upon a finding that Charles was not
negligent. Subsequently, Baker sues Charles alleging the same acts of negligence. Charles
may not assert the prior judgment of no negligence to foreclose Baker from litigating the
issue since Baker has never had an opportunity to prove the allegation in court.
8. The effect of the mutuality rule is quite different from that of due process. An illus-
tration, employing the facts of the hypothetical negligence case in note 7 supra, should clar-
ify the difference: Able sues Charles alleging negligence, and Able prevails on a finding that
Charles was negligent. Subsequently, Baker sues Charles alleging the same acts of negli-
gence. Even though due process considerations are satisfied since Charles has fully litigated
the issue, Baker may not use the adverse judgment to collaterally estop Charles from reliti-
gation since Baker was not a party to the prior action. Under the mutuality rule, therefore,
Charles will have another opportunity to disprove negligence. Due process preserves the
right to litigate an issue once; mutuality permits the same party to litigate an issue on as
many occasions as there are new parties.
9. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. at 649.
10. See id at 649.
11. See Blonder-Tongue v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971);
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952); Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d
Cir. 1950); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810, 122
P.2d 892, 894 (1942). See also note 35 infra.
12. See Blonder-Tongue v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bruszew-
ski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950); Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344
F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965) (applying Virginia law); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y. 2d
116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); In re Estate of Ellis, 460 Pa. 281, 333 A.2d 728
(1975). See also IB MOORE, supra note 1, $ 0.412[l], at 1805-07.
13. See generally IB MOORE, supra note 1, T 0.412[l], at 1807.
14. In both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel, the party against whom
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ever, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,15 the Supreme Court abandoned
the application of the mutuality rule in an offensive context, thus permit-
ting a plaintiff not a party to the prior action to raise collateral estoppel
and preclude litigation of an issue previously contested and lost by the
defendant.
Leo M. Shore, a shareholder of Parklane Hosiery, brought a stock-
holder's class action in federal district court against Parklane, alleging that
the company and several of its officers, directors, and stockholders had
issued a false and misleading proxy statement relating to a merger in viola-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act. 6 The complaint sought damages,
recission of the merger, and recovery of costs. Shortly thereafter but prior
to trial in the Shore case, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
sought to enjoin the merger in federal district court, substantially alleging
the same misfeasance concerning the proxy statement.' 7 In the SEC ac-
tion, the district court rendered a declaratory judgment against Parklane,
finding the proxy statement to be materially false and misleading.'8 The
Second Circuit affirmed.' 9
Shore subsequently moved for partial summary judgment seeking to
collaterally estop the defendant Parklane from relitigating the proxy issue
decided against it in the prior SEC action.2" The district court denied the
motion on the ground that an application of collateral estoppel would vio-
late Parklane's right to a jury trial.2 ' The Second Circuit reversed, finding
that, since the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
estoppel is asserted has litigated and lost in an earlier action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979).
15. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
16. Shore alleged that the proxy statement violated the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a), 78t(a) (1976) (former version codified in 15 U.S.C. §§
10(b), 14(a), 20 (a)), and certain rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. See Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. at 648.
17. The SEC alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§
78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976) (former version codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a)),
and violations of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), as well as rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1085
(2d Cir. 1977).
18. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
19. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
20. Only partial summary judgment was sought since in an action to recover under the
proxy rules, a plaintiff must prove that the proxy solicitation was false and misleading, that
he was injured, and that he was damaged. Since the SEC action was limited to the proxy
issue, Shore had to prove these other elements of his prima facie case in a stockholder's
private action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. at 648 n.2.
21. The grounds for denying the motion can only be inferred since the district court's
opinion did not explain its reasoning. The court merely cited Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59
(5th Cir. 1970), a case denying the application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
1980]
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proxy issue in the SEC action, collateral estoppel was appropriate. 22 The
court explained that the seventh amendment did not preclude the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel since the issues of fact to be presented to the jury
had already been fully litigated and decided in a nonjury trial.23
The Supreme Court, faced with a conflict between the circuits in two
cases with nearly identical facts,2 4 considered the appropriateness of non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel when its application deprives the de-
fendant of a jury trial in a second action. The Court held that nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel should not be foreclosed automatically in the
federal courts and that the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury does
not bar the doctrine's application. 25 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehn-
quist objected to this broader use of issue preclusion since it would prevent
litigants such as Parklane from obtaining a jury trial. 26
The majority's decision, following the trend of recent case law and com-
mentary, 27 renounced blanket application of mutuality in an offensive con-
text. While the majority failed to provide sufficient criteria to guide trial
courts considering the application of offensive collateral estoppel, it af-
forded them broad discretion to deny its application when it would pro-
duce unfair results. 2' Although this note will briefly discuss the seventh
amendment issue, its scope is limited to the issue of offensive use of non-
mutual collateral estoppel.
because it would have deprived a defendant of a jury trial. See Shore v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second
Circuit observed that it had dispensed with mutuality as a requirement in Zdanok v. Glid-
den Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). The court found that a complete identity of parties
served no purpose when the judgment is used against a person or privy who has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior action. Shore v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Zdanok, see notes 60-
66 and accompanying text infra.
23. 565 F.2d at 819.
24. A result contrary to the holding of the Second Circuit in Parklane had been reached
in Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of Rachal, see notes 67-73
and accompanying text infra.
25. 99 S. Ct. at 651, 654-55.
26. Id at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of
conducting an "antiseptic analysis" of the issues presented and of being unsympathetic to
Parklane. He explained that "[olutrage is an emotion all but impossible to generate with
respect to a corporate defendant in a securities fraud action." Id
27. See notes 30-73 and accompanying text infra.
28. 99 S. Ct. at 651-52.
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I. THE DEMISE OF THE MUTUALITY RULE
A. Defensive Collateral Estoppel and Mutuality
In both state and federal courts, the first inroads toward rejecting the
mutuality rule were made in cases involving the defensive use of non-
mutual collateral estoppel.2 9 In Bernhard v. Bank of America National
Trust & Savings Association,3° Justice Traynor initiated the reevaluation of
the mutuality rule. Bernhard, one of the plaintiffs in the first action, was a
beneficiary under a will who filed objections to an accounting, alleging
that the executor had improperly withdrawn estate funds for his personal
use. The state court found no impropriety, concluding that the funds were
the property of the executor who had been the beneficiary of a valid gift
from the decedent.3 Subsequently, Bernhard brought a second action
against the bank holding the funds on the grounds that the money had
been released to the executor without authorization. The bank then as-
serted the prior judgment in the action against the executor to estop the
subsequent litigation.32 The trial court rendered judgment for the bank,
and Bernhard appealed arguing that issue preclusion was improper under
the mutuality rule.33
On appeal, the California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the de-
cision of the trial court. The court observed that while due process consid-
erations forbid the use of collateral estoppel against one who was not a
party or in privity with a party in the first action, these considerations do
not apply to a party who has already litigated.34 Acknowledging century-
old criticisms of the mutuality rule,35 the court found no satisfactory ra-
tionale for foreclosing collateral estoppel asserted by a party stranger
29. See, e.g., Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1956). See notes 30-51 and accompanying text infra.
30. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
31. Id at 809, 122 P.2d at 893.
32. Id at 810-11,122 P.2d at 893-94. The estoppel in Bernhard was defensive, because
a defendant, not a party to the prior action, raised the doctrine as a defense in litigation with
a prior plaintiff.
33. Id at 809, 122 P.2d at 894.
34. Id at 809, 122 P.2d at 894-95. See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). Litigants who have never appeared in a
prior action, presented their evidence, or advanced arguments are entitled by due process to
an opportunity to litigate an issue fully and fairly. See id Thus, the issue preclusion doc-
trine cannot be invoked against a party stranger. See notes 7-8 supra.
35. 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895. The Court cited Jeremy Bentham's scathing
indictment of the mutuality rule:
Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger, the
contrary shall not be evidencefor him. If the rule itself is a curious one, the reason
given for it is still more so: "Nobody can take benefit by a verdict who had not
been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary:" a maxim which one would suppose to
1980]
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against a prior party.36 The court delineated three criteria for determining
when issue preclusion would be permitted: the issue in both actions must
be identical; there must be a final judgment on the merits in the prior ac-
tion; and the party against whom the judgment is asserted must be a prior
party. 7 Thus, the California Supreme Court became the first to reject the
mutuality rule as an obstacle to the assertion of defensive estoppel. After
Bernhard, federal courts gradually showed an equal willingness to discard
the confines of the mutuality rule.
In 1950, the Third Circuit in Bruszewski v. United States,38 became the
first United States Court of Appeals to repudiate openly the mutuality
rule. Bruszewski, a longshoreman injured on a vessel, sued the company
servicing the ship, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness but he failed to
prevail on either issue. Subsequently, Bruszewski sued the United States,
a defendant stranger, as owner of the ship, basing his claim for recovery on
identical grounds.39 In precluding relitigation of the issues, the court ex-
plained that the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel was not un-
fair because Bruszewski had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issues in the first action.4" The court established substantial justice and
fairness as the broad, essential requirements to be satisfied in applying the
have found its way from the gaming table to the bench .... This rule of mutuality
is destitute of even that semblance of reason.
J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J.
Bowring ed. 1843) (emphasis in original).
Exceptions to the mutuality rule have been created in specific categories of cases to miti-
gate against the harshness of its unreasoned application. For example, if a creditor first sues
a principal debtor who is exonerated, and subsequently sues a surety, the surety may assert
the prior judgment. See Note, Collateral Estoppel The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutual-
ity, 41 Mo. L. REV, 521, 522-24 (1976). A second exception permits an employer to assert a
judgment exonerating a servant from liability in a prior action to bar an action against the
employer based on a theory of vicarious liability. Id at 523. See generally RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 93-111 (1942); lB MOORE, supra note 1, 0.412[2-9], at 1812-34.
When an exception is not applicable, courts sometimes find privity even though the relation-
ship of the privy to the prior party may be somewhat attenuated. See Note, supra, at 523-24.
36. 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895. For the purposes of this note, a party stranger is
defined as one who was neither a party in the prior action, nor in privity with such a party,
but is a party to the subsequent action. Thus, if the first action is Able v. Baker and the
second action is Charles v. Baker, then Charles is a plaintiff stranger to the second action,
and Baker is a prior party or prior defendant.
37. 19 Cal.2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
38. 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).
39. Id at 420-21. The court noted that the two cases differed only in the claimant's
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. In the first action, plaintiff made the
Isthmian Steamship Company the responsible principal while the United States was charged
in the second action. Id. at 421.
40. Id at 421. The Court also explained that Bruszewski had the initiative in the first
action since he was plaintiff. Id See also note 55 and accompanying text infra.
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issue preclusion doctrine.4 Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit, in an-
other admiralty case, followed Bruszewski and permitted the defensive use
of nonmutual collateral estoppel.42
The Supreme Court, however, did not explicitly approve the reasoning
of Bernhard and its federal court counterparts4 3 until almost thirty years
after Justice Traynor's persuasive opinion. In Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,' the Court held that non-
mutual estoppel would be available to a defendant stranger facing patent
infringement litigation when the patent was declared invalid in a prior ac-
tion.45 In the first action, the University of Illinois Foundation had sued
another defendant for infringement of a patent on radio and television
equipment. A federal district court declared the patent invalid and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 6 A subsequent action by the foundation against
Blonder-Tongue alleged infringement of the same patent, but the district
court considered the validity of the patent de novo and found it to be valid.
This result, contrary to the prior acton, was affirmed by the Seventh Cir-
cuit.47 The Supreme Court's review acknowledged that the decision below
was properly based on existing case law foreclosing the use of collateral
estoppel in patent infringement cases.48 The Court questioned, however,
41. 181 F.2d at 421. The court considered justice and fairness as essential criteria, far
outweighing the symmetry of the traditional mutuality rule. In dismissing the argument that
one should not take advantage of a judgment unless he is bound by it, the Court stated little
more than that form should not triumph over substance, thus ridiculing the mutuality rule as
Bentham had done a century before. See note 35 supra.
42. See Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
932 (1951).
43. The Court specifically referred to Bernhard and Bruszewski as well as Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), a case permitting the offensive use of nonmutual
collateral estoppel. See Blonder-Tongue v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 322-
25 (1971).
44. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
45. Id at 350.
46. University of Ill. Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967),
afl'd, 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
47. 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970).
48. See Blonder-Tongue v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. at 317-20. Prior to
Blonder-Tongue, application of the mutuality rule was mandated by Triplett v. Lowell, 297
U.S. 638 (1936). The Triplet Court stated the rule in the following terms:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudication adverse
to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit upon the same claims
against a different defendant. While the earlier decision may by comity be given
great weight in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree,
it is not res adudicata and may not be pleaded as a defense.
Id at 642. Although the Court used the terminology of res judicata, it referred to an action
involving different parties, thus compelling the conclusion that its rule applies to estoppel by
issue preclusion. See generally note 1 supra.
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the continued viability of the mutuality rule in patent litigation and par-
tially overruled it to permit defensive collateral estoppel by a party facing
litigation on a patent previously declared invalid.49 Thus, the decision in
Blonder-Tongue represented the Supreme Court's first repudiation of the
mutuality rule. Nevertheless, while Blonder-Tongue provided momentum
for the continuing demise of the mutuality rule, its application to nonpat-
ent litigation and to an offensive application of collateral estoppel re-
mained undecided.50
B. Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Mutuality
Under what became the persuasive precedent of Bernhard,5 courts con-
tinued to reject the mutuality rule in defensive applications of collateral
estoppel. In the offensive context, however, the Bernhard doctrine re-
ceived only cautious acceptance.
One noted commentator, Brainerd Currie, argued that the Bernhard
doctrine should be limited to factually similar cases, i e., a "defensive use"
of collateral estoppel.52 He cautioned courts to refrain from permitting a
plaintiff stranger to assert a prior judgment if the defendant faces more
49. 402 U.S. at 349-50. The Court observed that several recommendations had been
made by presidential and senate committees to eliminate by statute the mutuality require-
ment in patent litigation. Id at 335-43. The recommendations of these committees may
have encouraged the Court to overrule Triplett but limit its holding to patent litigation.
50. Professor Moore, for example, does not interpret Blonder-Tongue as limited to pat-
ent litigation. See IB MOORE, supra note I, 0.412[l], at 109 (Supp. 1978-79).
51. The opinion went virtually unnoticed at the time of publication, provoking com-
ment in only one law review article. Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither
Parties Nor Privies - Two California Cases, 57 HARV. L. REV. 98 (1943). See Currie, Mutu-
ality of Collateral Estoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Currie I]. The opinion has now been termed a "classic of jurisprudence
• . . substituting reason for unreason in the law." Currie, Civil Procedure.- The Tempest
Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Currie II].
52. See generally Currie I, supra note 51. Currie enumerated four situations in which
nonmutual issue preclusion might be applied. He characterized two of them as "defensive"
and two of them as "offensive" applications. Defensive applications occur when the judg-
ment is asserted as a defense to a claim by a defendant stranger against a prior plaintiff or
against a prior defendant. Offensive use occurs when the judgment is asserted by a plaintiff
stranger to establish, without litigation, a claim against a prior defendant or against a prior
plaintiff. Id at 289-91. Currie described Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), as an example of the defensive use in its fullest
sense: "[lit was asserted by the defendant against one who was an aggressor in the prior
action." Currie I, supra note 51, at 292. Other commentators later joined Currie in making
offensive/defensive distinctions and in expressing reservations about the offensive applica-
tion of nonmutual collateral estoppel. See generally Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality
and Joinder ofParties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Vestal, supra note 1; Comment, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
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than two successive actions on the same issue or if he has been prejudiced
by a lack of control and initiative as a defendant in the previous action.-
3
The former concern was based upon a fear that broad application of the
Bernhard doctrine would result in what Currie referred to as a "multiple
claimant anomaly." This would occur when one decision, adverse to a
prior party, is inconsistent with previous ones and when the so-called
"anomalous finding" is perpetuated by subsequent application of collat-
eral estoppel. 4 Currie's second reservation was that the prior party, if a
defendant in the first action, might have less than a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issue. Such a lack of "initiative" is significant to the
extent that the prior party, having no control over where or when the ac-
tion is brought, might have been handicapped in gathering evidence or
witnesses in the presentation of its case. 5
Several years later, however, Currie retracted his recommendations and
argued that imposition of a rule of thumb prohibiting nonmutual offensive
estoppel against a prior defendant lacking initiative was unnecessary. 6 In
Currie's opinion, the preferable approach, endorsed by Justice Traynor in
a post-Bernhard California case, is to evaluate the merits of estoppel on a
case-by-case basis.5 7 A court should conduct a detailed inquiry into the
prior judgment to determine whether it would be fair to allow a party
53. Currie I, supra note 51, at 308-09.
54. Id at 285-87. The model for Currie's multiple claimant anomaly is a hypothetical
negligence case against a railroad sued in 50 separate actions by passengers injured in a
single accident. The railroad wins the first 25 cases but loses the twenty-sixth. In theory,
offensive collateral estoppel principles can thereafter require judgments adverse to the rail-
road in the remaining 24 cases although the railroad could not assert the first 25 favorable
judgments to estop subsequent plaintiff strangers from relitigating the issue of negligence.
See notes 7-8 supra. Assuming the facts and issues in each claim are identical, the same
conduct would, therefore, be both negligent and not negligent. If the questions of law and
fact are identical, clearly one finding is in error, and the anomalous verdict may have been
the first one as easily as the twenty-sixth.
55. Currie I, supra note 51, at 288. The initiative advantage is probably of little impor-
tance in federal courts applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, whereby the defend-
ant can exercise a right of transfer to a more convenient forum. The application of this
doctrine would obviate the need for protection from the handicaps described by Currie. See
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419
(3d Cir. 1950), the court considered the initiative issue and permitted the use of defensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel since Bruszewski, the plaintiff in both actions, had sufficient
control over the lawsuit. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
56. -See Currie II, supra note 51, at 29, 37.
57. Id at 28-29. Justice Traynor applied this case-by-case approach in Teitelbaum
Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962). He
concluded that despite lack of initiative in the prior action on criminal charges, the defend-
ant had a "full opportunity to litigate the issue" and "every motive to make as vigorous and
effective a defense as possible." Id at 603, 375 P.2d at 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62. Accord-
ingly, collateral estoppel was applied in the subsequent action, and the finding that the Tei-
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stranger to assert the judgment as collateral estoppel. 58 As Currie recog-
nized, the fair application of offensive issue preclusion in multiple claim-
ant litigation is not only acceptable but also desirable absent evidence of a
compromise verdict or other impropriety.59
Finally, Currie noted with approval Zdanok v. Glidden Co. ,60 in which
the Second Circuit led the way for a complete repudiation of the mutuality
requirement by affirmatively declaring nonmutual offensive estoppel to be
permissible. This decision was the first by a court of appeals to permit the
use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in the federal courts. Zda-
nok involved two consolidated cases in which plaintiffs were employees
seeking to establish certain benefits under a single collective bargaining
agreement. Zdanok and other employees brought one action, and Alexan-
der and other employees brought a second action against the same em-
ployer, Glidden.6
Prior to consolidation, the Zdanok action was litigated and appealed in
federal courts while the Alexander action remained dormant in a state
court. During this first round of litigation, the Second Circuit reached a
conclusion favorable to Zdanok on the issue of contract interpretation and
remanded the case for the sole purpose of ascertaining damages. The re-
sult reached by the court of appeals remained unchanged despite Supreme
Court review of an unrelated issue.62 The day after Zdanok was decided
in the Supreme Court, however, the Alexander employees filed a com-
telbaum corporation was guilty of robbery was conclusive of the liability of insurers for the
value of goods Teitelbaum had stolen from itself. 1d.
58. See Currie II, supra note 51, at 28-29.
59. Currie II, supra note 5 1, at 36. Currie referred to the offensive use of estoppel as a
"powerful instrument for the expeditious and economical handling of massive litigation
such as that resulting from major disasters and other events and transactions affecting large
numbers of people." Id For an excellent example of the application of nonmutual offen-
sive estoppel in a multiple claim disaster case and an analysis of the various obstacles to the
use of the doctrine, see generally United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709
(E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), aff#din part subnom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (mutuality not required and res judicata per-
missible). But see generally Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958)
(public policy requires that res judicata should not apply to multiple claim litigation); Price
v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 164 Cal. App. 2d 400, 330 P.2d 933 (1958) (res judicata will not
apply prior judgments to subsequent cases in claims arising from train derailment). The
term resjudicala was used loosely in these cases to indicate preclusion doctrines although
they involved what is correctly termed collateral estoppel. Such confusion has not been
unusual. See generally notes 5, 48 supra.
60. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Id. at 947. The complicated procedural history of the Zdanok litigation com-
menced when the original complaint was dismissed, 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rep'd,
288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd in part, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
62. See 327 F.2d at 947.
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plaint in federal court. Since the Alexander state court action was then
discontinued by stipulation, the two cases were consolidated for trial. Al-
though the district court judge took testimony pertinent to contract inter-
pretation and concluded that the employee benefits were not inherent in
the agreement, he found for plaintiffs on the basis that the interpretation of
the court of appeals in the prior Zdanok decision should govern the con-
63tract construction.
In affirming this result, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Friendly, held that collateral estoppel precluded Glidden from relitigating
the issue of contract interpretation with the Alexander employees. Thus,
even though the Alexander action involved new parties and new evidence,
the judgment in the prior Zdanok action on the issue of contract interpre-
tation was conclusive against Alexander.'
In so holding, the Second Circuit acknowledged the Bernhard decision
with unqualified approval,65 confronted Currie's initial reservations, and
rejected the rule of thumb approach prohibiting nonmutual offensive es-
toppel in favor of a case-by-case review. The court concluded that the
defendant Glidden had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior action, that the prior Zdanok plaintiffs enjoyed no procedural
advantage handicapping Glidden's defense, and that multiple claims were
not a disadvantage to Glidden who, with knowledge of the pendency of an
additional action, litigated vigorously in the first claim.66
Despite this endorsement of nonmutual offensive estoppel by the Second
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit several years later reached a contrary conclusion.
In Rachal v. Hill,6 7 plaintiffs sought to offensively estop defendants from
relitigating the issue of their liability for engaging in practices violative of
63. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 216 F. Supp. 476, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
64. 327 F.2d at 954. The court applied the doctrine of the law of the case under which
the contract construction established in the first Zdanok action controlled subsequent litiga-
tion in the same case. Law of the case differs from res judicata because it applies only to
decisions of law made within the context of a single given case prior to a judgment. Such
decisions are perpetuated throughout the course of that case as law of the case. This rule
was not dispositive of Alexander since it was a different case. Id at 953.
65. In an often quoted remark, Judge Friendly referred to Bernhard v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), as the "widest breach in the
citadel of mutuality." 327 F.2d at 954.
66. Id at 956. The court prefaced its holding with a discussion of evidence presented
during the trial of the consolidated claims, and it hypothesized that the proofs adduced
might have "tipped the scales" in favor of Glidden. Id at 954. Ironically, in becoming the
first court of appeals to permit the application of nonmutual offensive estoppel, the Second
Circuit admitted that the result might have differed had the doctrine been denied. Id
67. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). See note 24 supra.
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the Securities Exchange Act.6" These same practices had been enjoined by
a federal district court in a nonjury equitable action brought by the SEC.6 9
Since the second action involved legal damages, however, the defendants
claimed they were entitled to a de novo trial by jury.7° The federal district
court applied collateral estoppel to the second action, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that application of the doctrine was impermissible be-
cause it would deny defendants their seventh amendment right to a jury
trial.7 ' Although the court indicated in dicta that it would no longer ad-
here to the mutuality rule in applying estoppel,7 2 it emphasized that non-
mutual collateral estoppel should not be applied if "some overriding
consideration of fairness to a litigant dictates a different result in the cir-
cumstances of the case."73
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Rachal v. Hill was examined seven
years later by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery after the Second
Circuit, on almost identical facts, reached a contrary result. Thus, federal
court abandonment of the mutuality rule in offensive estoppel cases, first
initiated in Zdanok, was finally reviewed by the Supreme Court.
II. PARKL4NE HOSIERY Co. v SHORE: A QUALIFIED REJECTION OF
THE MUTUALITY RULE
A. Mutuality Rule Abandonment
In Parklane, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of nonmutual offen-
sive estoppel. Although it properly rejected rigid adherence to the mutual-
ity rule, the Court failed to make clear the circumstances under which
assertion of the doctrine would be permissible.
The Court articulated the mutuality and jury trial issues as distinct in-
68. 435 F.2d at 60.
69. Id.
70. Id at 63-64.
71. Id. at 64.
72. Id at 62. Since it reversed the decision of the district court on other grounds, the
court did not directly rule on the mutuality issue. Any remaining doubt about the law in the
Fifth Circuit, however, was removed by the court's decision in Poster Exchange, Inc. v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976),
that mutuality of estoppel was no longer necessary.
73. 435 F.2d at 64 (citing Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950)).
Presumably, in the court's opinion, considerations of fairness would prevent the use of es-
toppel to foreclose the defendant from a jury trial. Such an interpretation is supported by
the court's heavy reliance on Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (when legal
and equitable issues are mixed in a single claim, legal issues should be tried first to preserve
trial by jury). See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra. See also Shapiro & Coquil-
lette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases.'A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV.
442 (1971).
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quiries. It first considered whether collateral estoppel would preclude liti-
gation of an issue previously decided in an equitable proceeding when
estoppel was invoked by a plaintiff stranger.7 4 Second, assuming non-
mutual offensive estoppel was permissible, the Court considered whether
its application would violate Parklane's right to a jury trial.75
Citing Blonder-Tongue with approval, the Court criticized the mutuality
requirement, noting that the rule failed to distinguish between the rights of
a party who had once fully and fairly litigated and one who had no oppor-
tunity to litigate at all.76 The Court acknowledged Blonder- Tongue's rejec-
tion of mutuality in patent litigation77 but indicated that the case was
decisive of the broader issue of the continued vitality of mutuality, at least
with regard to defensive applications of collateral estoppel.78 In contrast
to Blonder-Tongue, the Court in Parklane focused its discussion on the
offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel.
The Court concluded that offensive and defensive applications of non-
mutual collateral estoppel must be treated differently 79 and offered several
reasons for this distinction. First, defensive use encourages judicial econ-
omy by inducing the plaintiffs to join all possible defendants lest other
defendants take advantage of an adverse finding by virtue of estoppel. In
offensive use, however, the Court reasoned that a contrary incentive exists.
Potential plaintiffs can take advantage of a verdict adverse to the defend-
ant after allowing another plaintiff to litigate but will not be bound by a
contrary determination because of due process considerations. 80 Second,
the offensive use of collateral estoppel may be unfair to a defendant who
fails to defend vigorously in a prior action due to a nominal claim and the
unforeseeability of subsequent litigation.8' Moreover, offensive estoppel
may be unfair if the judgment invoked to estop subsequent litigation is
itself inconsistent with previous findings favorable to the defendant. 82 Fi-
74. 99 S. Ct. at 648-49.
75. Id. at 652.
76. Id at 649. The Court acknowledged that due process requires that a litigant be
given an opportunity to be heard before being bound by a judgment. Id at n.7. See also
note 7 supra.
77. Id at 649.
78. id at 650. By quoting dicta in Blonder-Tongue critical of the mutuality rule in
general, the Court implicitly extended Blonder-Tongue to nonmutual defensive estoppel
outside of the patent litigation context.
79. Id The Court referred to various commentators, including Currie, to support the
distinction drawn between defensive and offensive applications of nonmutual estoppel. Id
at n.ll.
80. Id at 650-51. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
81. ld. at 651.
82. Id. The Court shared Professor Currie's fear of a "multiple claimant anomaly" and
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nally, the possibility of unfairness inheres in other situations as well, par-
ticularly when different procedural opportunities are available in the
subsequent litigation which could produce a different result.83
Despite these reservations concerning the nonmutual offensive use of es-
toppel, the Court concluded that its application should not automatically
be foreclosed in federal courts.84 Rather, trial courts should use "broad
discretion" in determining the appropriateness of applying nonmutual of-
fensive estoppel.85 Such an application of issue preclusion should be de-
nied if the plaintiff invoking it could have easily joined in the first action or
if unfairness would result because of any of the reasons articulated by the
court or from "other reasons. 86
Applying its "broad discretion" model, the Court found no reason for
denying estoppel in Parklane since the plaintiff probably could not have
joined in the SEC action. Furthermore, because of the seriousness of the
allegations, Parklane had the incentive to litigate the prior action "fully
and vigorously."87 There were no prior inconsistent judgments or addi-
tional procedural advantages available to Parklane in the subsequent liti-
gation that might have produced a different result.88 Although, in a
footnote, the Court conceded that Parklane would have been entitled to a
jury trial in the subsequent action, it described the presence of a jury as a
"neutral" factor rather than as an additional procedural opportunity. 89
Under this analysis, Parklane, having had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the proxy issue in the SEC action, was collaterally estopped from
relitigating it in the second action brought against it by stockholders.
The Court also examined whether the application of nonmutual offen-
sive collateral estoppel would violate Parklane's seventh amendment right
referred to Currie's hypothetical to demonstrate the potential for unfairness. Id at n. 14.
See notes 54-59 and accompanying text supra.
83. 99 S. Ct. at 651. For example, an inconvenient forum could disadvantage a defend-
ant, possibly resulting in an unfair application of collateral estoppel. Id at n. 15. Although
no mention is made of Currie's initiative rule, see notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra,
the Court was expressing similar concerns. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
84. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
85. Id. This "broad discretion" approach is, in many respects, identical to the case-by-
case review recommended by both Traynor and Currie. See note 57 and accompanying text
supra.
86. 99 S. Ct. at 651-52. The Court did not explain what "other reasons" would be ap-
propriate to deny a plaintiff stranger the use of offensive estoppel. See notes 104-06 and
accompanying text infra.
87. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
88. Id See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
89. 99 S. Ct. at 652 n. 19. The Court described defending in an inconvenient forum as a
material difference unlike the presence or absence of a jury. Id See also note 55 and
accompanying text supra.
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to a jury trial. Finding historical support, the Court applied the principle
that an equitable proceeding could be used to estop relitigation in a court
of law. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a finding in a nonjury trial
in a court of equity could be conclusive of further litigation to which the
right to a jury trial has attached. 9°
Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, declined to address the general is-
sue of nonmutual offensive estoppel. 9' Rather, he argued that under the
circumstances of the case, the doctrine's use would be impermissible be-
cause it violated Parklane's right to a jury trial.92 Although Justice Rehn-
quist applied the "broad discretion" test employed by the majority, he
reasoned that a jury trial, like other procedural opportunities, could lead to
a different result. He observed that while the merits of civil juries have
long been debated, they can hardly be accused of being "neutral factors." 93
Thus, contrary to the majority, he concluded that it would be unfair to
90. See 99 S. Ct. at 654-55. The Court found support for its conclusion in Beacon
Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), but as the Fifth Circuit noted in Rachal v. Hill,
435 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1970), Beacon Theatres is most often cited as support for preserva-
tion of the right to a jury trial. See note 73 and accompanying text supra. See also Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 396 U.S. 469 (1962).
The majority's decision on the jury issue denied any relationship between the seventh
amendment and the mutuality rule. The Court reasoned that a party estopped from reliti-
gating an issue before a jury with a party stranger would no more suffer a constitutional
violation than he would if the claimant had been a party to the prior action. 99 S. Ct. at 654.
In either case, the party estopped would have had an opportunity to litigate the issue once,
and a finding of fact would have been made. Id In the majority's view, the evolution of the
doctrine of nonmutual estoppel was not repugnant to the Constitution, even though it did
not exist under the common law at the time of the drafting of the seventh amendment. Id at
654-55.
91. Id at 655 n.I.
92. Id at 658-61. Justice Rehnquist accepted Parklane's contention that the scope of
the seventh amendment right to trial by jury should be determined by reference to the com-
mon law as it existed in 1791. After engaging in a lengthy historical analysis, he concluded
that Parklane would have been entitled to a jury trial in 1791 and argued this right should be
preserved. Id at 659-60. Justice Rehnquist also explained that even if there were no consti-
tutional prohibition, application of nonmutual estoppel to Parklane was inappropriate be-
cause of "the strong federal policy favoring jury trials." Id at 661-62. Not surprisingly,
Justice Rehnquist cited Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), as authority for
his position. fd But see note 90 and accompanying text supra.
93. See 99 S. Ct. at 663 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was not reluctant
to criticize the majority's premise that a jury trial would have no effect on the outcome of the
litigation: "IT]hose who drafted the Declaration of Independence and debated so passion-
ately the proposed Constitution during the ratification period, [sic] would indeed be as-
tounded to learn that the presence or absence of a jury is merely 'neutral,' whereas the
availability of discovery . . . may be controlling ...." Id at 655 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). See generally James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45
YALE L.J. 1022 (1936); O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases, 58 ILL. BAR. J. 796 (1970); Paul,
Jerome Frank's Views on Trial by Jury, 22 Mo. L. REV. 28 (1977).
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apply the doctrine of nonmutual estoppel to Parklane.94
B. Reliability Testing Under Parklane
If the mere possibility of a different result were the Court's only criteria
for determining whether or not nonmutual estoppel should apply, Justice
Rehnquist's argument that a jury might reach a different result should
have controlled. However, the majority's explanation of the criteria by
which trial courts should apply their "broad discretion" was not so simplis-
tic. At the outset, the majority recognized, as did Currie, the need for dis-
tinguishing between nonmutual offensive and defensive collateral estoppel
because of the potential for abuse of the former.95 The Court feared that a
plaintiff stranger might take unfair advantage of a judgment against a
prior defendant and attempted to describe circumstances in which this
might occur. This potential unfairness arises from several factors affecting
the quality of litigation and ultimately the reliability of the prior judgment.
Since applications of nonmutual offensive estoppel do involve a higher risk
of perpetuating an unreliable verdict, the Court's offensive/defensive dis-
tinction will provide needed protection for defendants facing sequential
actions.96
The Court recognized that such protection was necessary for a prior de-
fendant strategically disadvantaged in the first action. For example, non-
mutual offensive estoppel should be denied if the defendant, lacking
initiative and choice of forum in the prior action, was handicapped in dis-
covery or the presentation of witnesses.97 Factors such as a defendant's
incentive to litigate and procedural advantages may not only affect the
judgment and require denial of estoppel, but they may also affect the qual-
ity of litigation and the completeness of the case presented to the
factfinder.
Thus, the Court recognized that unfairness to a defendant results from
the perpetuation of a judgment based on a less than reasoned review of the
factual foundation of the issues. The potential for unfairness arises in such
cases since reliability is subject to attack when the factfinder's determina-
tion is based on incomplete information. The unarticulated rule of the
case, therefore, is that nonmutual offensive estoppel should not be permit-
94. 99 S. Ct. at 658-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A similar position was taken in
Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1970). See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
95. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
96. These concerns arise only when estoppel is asserted against a defendant in the sec-
ond action who was also a defendant in the first action. See generally note 54 and accompa-
nying text supra.
97. 99 S. Ct. at 651 n.15. See notes 55, 83 and accompanying text supra.
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ted if for some reason the prior judgment is potentially or actually unrelia-
ble. 98
In this light, it is not difficult to understand the Court's proposition that
the presence or absence of a jury is "neutral." A finding may be unreliable
if the factfinder does not have a complete case before it, regardless of
whether the factfinder is a judge or jury. On the other hand, if the
factfinder has a complete case before it, there is no reason to suspect error.
Unless it is otherwise shown, the factfinder will be deemed to have reached
the correct result. Neutrality is a function of whether the factfinder
reached a reliable result rather than whether judges and juries may dif-
fer.9 9
Moreover, the reliability test employed by the Court is responsive to
both of Currie's initial reservations concerning the offensive use of non-
mutual estoppel. 0 Although the absence of initiative alone is not fatal to
an assertion of estoppel when it is coupled with disadvantages of inconve-
nience or procedural handicaps, it so affects reliability as to permit relitiga-
tion. In addition, the Court's reliability test is responsive to the fear of
perpetuation of an anomalous verdict. The Court cautioned trial courts to
avoid unfairness by refusing estoppel when the judgment asserted as con-
clusive of subsequent proceedings is inconsistent with previous ones.' °"
Rather than perpetuate the anomaly, the Court would permit a defendant
to litigate subsequent claims with the same chance of success or failure in
each.
The Court's decision, however, failed to provide guidance when the first
judgment is the anomaly. In such cases there are no inconsistent verdicts,
and Parklane provides no directive to deny estoppel. 0 2 Arguably then,
Parklane may not preclude an anomalous judgment from being perpetu-
ated. If the first verdict is of questionable reliability, however, the Park-
lane test would be responsive. The defendant could assert numerous
reasons why the first litigation was so unreliable that its result should not
98. The potential for unreliability was discussed by Professor Currie: "Courts can only
do their best to determine the truth on the basis of the evidence, and the first lesson one must
learn on the subject of res judicata is that judicial findings must not be confused with abso-
lute truth." Currie I, supra note 51, at 315.
99. But see 99 S. Ct. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (juries might reach a result that a
judge either could not or would not reach).
100. See notes 54, 59 and accompanying text supra.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 651. When prior inconsistent verdicts exist, two factfinders, presented
with nearly identical issues, have reached opposite results. Contrary results on similar issues
obviously increase the probability that one of the former findings is unreliable. See note 54
supra.
102. The Court did advise, however, that nonmutual offensive estoppel could be denied
for "other reasons." 99 S. Ct. at 651. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
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be perpetuated. 0 3
The majority's test is, therefore, designed to avoid the potential abuses
of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. However, by declining to pre-
scribe the "other reasons" for which its application should be denied, the
Court may have defeated the articulated policies behind the estoppel doc-
trine. Such a broadly worded directive may serve only to increase litiga-
tion, thus defeating the doctrine's purpose of promoting judicial economy
and avoiding inconsistent results."° A defendant may now assert any
number of reasons why it would be unfair to permit estoppel by a plaintiff
in a second action. These reasons could range from the incompetency of
counsel in the prior action 0 5 to the discovery of new evidence in a subse-
quent one.' 0 6 In addition, a court could consider the availability of a pre-
viously unavailable witness, impeachment of evidence in a subsequent
collateral proceeding, or a change in the rules of evidence or civil proce-
dure. Insofar as these factors have a bearing on reliability, they should be
considered by trial courts. On the other hand, if the asserted "other rea-
sons" are unrelated to reliability, they should not be permitted to frustrate
the policy considerations underlying the issue preclusion doctrine. Never-
theless, without clear evidence that the asserted reasons had a strong bear-
ing on the outcome of the prior litigation, it is unlikely that the "broad
discretion" afforded trial courts will be significantly curtailed.
Future litigation under Parklane's unarticulated reliability test will
probably produce divergent definitions of the contours of variations in ju-
dicial discretion. If trial courts recognize, however, that the Parklane crite-
ria for denying or applying collateral estoppel are motivated by the
Supreme Court's reluctance to perpetuate an unreliable verdict, they will
exercise caution in permitting the use of nonmutual offensive estoppel.
10 7
Practitioners may be able to preserve a defendant's right to litigate by ap-
pealing to the caution incumbent upon the trial court through the presen-
tation of reasons why the prior judgment is so unreliable as to permit a
103. See notes 104-06 and accompanying text infra.
104. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
105. But see Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 901 (4th Cir. 1965).
106. See United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (E.D. Wash., D.
Nev. 1962), af'd in part sub nom. United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (discovery of new evidence is possible bar to the application
of nonmutual offensive estoppel). But see Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d at 954 (new
evidence that might affect a verdict not admissible in the application of offensive collateral
estoppel).
107. See 99 S. Ct. at 650-51. Parklane set the tone for conservatism in this area by
emphasizing that nonmutual offensive estoppel deserved special consideration and by en-
gaging in a lengthy discussion of its potential abuses. See id; notes 95-98 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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different result if the issues were relitigated. Nevertheless, while the effec-
tiveness of Parklane as a litigation tool by which a plaintiff stranger may
invoke offensive collateral estoppel remains to be seen, the wise practi-
tioner will raise and preserve the claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the use of nonmutual offensive estoppel is no longer fore-
closed in the federal courts, every case in which the claim is asserted will
be subjected to a demanding and cautious review. The Court furnished
trial courts with criteria limiting the use of estoppel in an offensive context
and afforded them broad latitude to reject the doctrine if for any "other
reasons" its application would be unfair.
Parklane properly repudiates a dogmatic and unreasoned application of
the mutuality rule while striving to address the concerns responsible for
the rule. The Court, however, failed to articulate how unfair results might
occur from an application of nonmutual offensive estoppel, and it left to
the trial courts the task of formulating the reliability test implicit in its
holding. Failure to adhere to the policies underlying the reliability test
may result in the denial of estoppel when it is appropriate or in its wrong-
ful application. Nevertheless, a careful reading of Parklane and a cautious
approach by trial courts may salvage an otherwise progressive change in
the tenets of civil procedure.
Linda J Soldo
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